Many stock market analysts think that in 1929, at the time of the crash, stocks were overvalued. Irving Fisher argued just before the crash that fundamentals were strong and the stock market was undervalued. In this paper, we use growth theory to estimate the fundamental value of corporate equity and compare it to actual stock valuations. Our estimate is based on values of productive corporate capital, both tangible and intangible, and tax rates on corporate income and distributions. The evidence strongly suggests that Fisher was right. Even at the 1929 peak, stocks were undervalued relative to the prediction of theory.
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"Fisher Says Prices of Stocks Are Low," said a headline in the New York Times on October 22, 1929, referring to economist Irving Fisher. Two days later, the stock market crashed, and by the end of November the New York Stock Exchange was down 30 percent from its peak. Fisher had based his statement on strong earnings reports, few industrial disputes, and evidence of high investment in research and development (R&D) and in other intangible capital. But since market prices fell dramatically so soon after Fisher's statement, most analysts and economic historians concluded that Fisher was wrong: in October 1929 stocks were overvalued.
In this paper, we use modern growth theory to evaluate this conclusion. When stocks of corporations are correctly priced, this theory says, their market value should equal the value of corporations' productive assets, what we will call the fundamental value of corporations.
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Productive assets include both tangible and intangible assets. We have direct measures of corporate tangible capital and land and of the tax rates that affect the prices of these assets.
We also have measures of profits and the growth rate of the economy which, together with the tangible capital measures, allow us to infer the size of the stock of intangible capital in the corporate sector. We thus can compare the total value of corporate productive assets to the actual market value of corporate stocks at the time of the crash.
Our results support Fisher's view. A conservative estimate of the fundamental value of U.S. corporations in 1929-which assumes as low a value for intangible capital as observations allow-is at least 21 times the value of after-tax corporate earnings (or 1.9 times gross national product or GNP). The highest estimate of the actual 1929 market value of corporate stocks (based on samples of publicly traded stocks) is 19 times the value of after-tax corporate earnings at their peak in 1929 (or 1.67 times GNP). This is strong evidence that Fisher was right: stock prices in the fall of 1929 were a little low relative to fundamental values.
Our estimate of the fundamental value of corporations depends in an important way on the value of intangible capital owned by corporations. Fisher's (1930) conclusion that the stock market was not overvalued in August of 1929 followed from his view that the corporate stock of intangible capital was large. We find that only if the value of corporate intangible capital was zero and the real return on tangible capital was very high by historical standards would the conclusion-reached by De Long and Shleifer (1991) and Rappoport and White (1993) -that the stock market was 30 percent overvalued follow.
The question then is how big is the stock of corporate intangible capital. Fisher (1930) provides many examples of intangible investments, but was limited to anecdotal evidence to make his case that the stock in 1929 was large. We do not have direct measures either, but we use national income statistics to construct an estimate. 3 We show that even for the smallest level of intangible capital consistent with the data, the stock market in October 1929 was not overvalued relative to the predictions of theory. We estimate that the stock of intangible corporate capital was sizable-at least 60 percent of the stock of tangible corporate capital.
If stock prices were not inflated beyond their fundamental values in October 1929, why did the market crash? Answering that question is not addressed here. But we can point out here that the dramatic decline in stock prices is consistent with monetary policy actions at the time. 4 Before the crash, the Federal Reserve severely tightened credit to stock investors because, it said, "the unprecedented rise of security prices gave unmistakable evidence of an absorption of the country's credit in speculative security operations to an alarming extent" (Federal Reserve Board, 1929, pp. 1-2) . Not long after the crash, the Fed eased credit, and stock prices recovered. 5 This correlation is worthy of its own detailed investigation.
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To assess Fisher's view that stock prices in 1929 were low, we first report estimates for the market value of U.S. corporations at the end of August 1929, when stock prices peaked. By "market value" here, we mean the market capitalization of corporations. Data are available for large, representative subsets of U.S. corporations. Here, we use these data to produce a range of estimates for the market value of all U.S. corporations. GNP. This is a good way to estimate the total market value as long as the P/E ratio for the set of corporations is near the P/E ratio for the corporate sector as a whole. Also reported in Table 1 are the market value relative to GNP and the P/E ratio for each subset of companies. The fifth estimate in Table 1 is obtained by multiplying the market value of all companies trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) by a factor that held throughout the post-World War II period; for that period, we have data on the market value of all corporations from the Federal Reserve Board's U.S. flow of funds accounts (Federal Reserve Board, 1945 -2000 .
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In the table, the estimates for the market value of U.S. corporations range between 1.24 and 1.67 times GNP. We think that the best estimate is 1.54 times GNP, which is 17.5 times after-tax corporate earnings. This estimate is based on the study of Sloan (1936) . The estimate we will use as the actual market value in our comparison, however, is 1.67 times GNP in 1929, or 19 times the after-tax corporate earnings in 1929, based on the Standard and Poor's (S&P) composite price index. By using a high estimate of the market value, we are being conservative in evaluating Fisher's view that the stock market was not overvalued just before the crash of 1929.
We view the estimate of Sloan (1936) as the best because it is the result of a detailed study of 135 industrial corporations, using the best data available at the time. The study was done at the Standard Statistics Company, which later merged with Poor's Publishing to become Standard and Poor's. The corporations studied had fully documented financial histories over the 1922-33 period and were thought to be representative of large companies in business at that time. The study provides detailed income accounts and balance sheets 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 - The Ratio of After-Tax Corporate Profits to GNP, 1925 GNP, -2000 for the aggregate and specific details for major industries and major corporations.
At the peak of the stock market in late August and early September 1929, the common stocks of the companies in Sloan's (1936) sample had a market value of $30.8 billion. This is about one-third of the market value of all stocks traded on the NYSE at that time. For the year 1929, the after-tax net profits available for the common stock of these companies totaled $1.76 billion. If the companies in the Sloan (1936) study are representative of the U.S. economy, then we can use the market value and after-tax profits for these companies to get an estimate of the total value of all corporations.
In Figure 1 , we plot the annual ratio of economy-wide after-tax corporate profits to GNP We use the same procedure with companies in the S&P indices. In Table A2 For the 50 industrial companies in the S&P index, the ratio of the total market capitalization to net earnings is 18.4. Aggregate earnings and this P/E ratio imply an estimate for the aggregate market capitalization of 1.62 times GNP. This is slightly higher than Sloan's (1936) estimate, which was based on a broader subset of industrial companies.
To compute an estimate of the total market capitalization using all 90 companies in the S&P composite index, we first construct weights on industrials, railroads, and public utilities using the entire population of companies in the CRSP database for August 1929.
We find that the market capitalization of railroads (SIC 4000) in the CRSP population is 12 percent of the total. We find that the market capitalization of public utilities-including 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 To summarize, the range of estimates for the market value of all U.S. corporations relative to GNP is from 1.24 to 1.67. We think that Sloan's (1936) estimate of 1.54 is the best, but to be conservative, we will work with the highest estimate of 1.67 times GNP, or 19 times corporate earnings.
Now we need an estimate of the fundamental value of U.S. corporations to compare with the market value just reported. By "fundamental value" here, we mean the value of the underlying productive assets-both tangible and intangible-of the corporate sector. In this section, we construct a lower-bound estimate of the fundamental value of U.S. corporations in August 1929. We show that this estimate exceeds the contemporary market value of U.S. corporations.
If corporate investments are positive and funded out of retained earnings, growth theory says that the fundamental value of a corporation should be equal to
where K T is the end-of-period resource cost of tangible capital, K I is the end-of-period resource cost of intangible capital, τ dist is the tax rate on corporate distributions, and τ prof is the tax rate on corporate profits.
9 The price of tangible capital for the shareholders is (1 − τ dist ), not 1. The distribution tax affects this price because a dollar reinvested is not taxed, but a dollar distributed is. The price of intangible capital also depends on the corporate profits tax rate because investments in intangible capital are expensed and reduce taxable corporate income.
In the next sections we describe the measures we use for the tax rates and capital stocks. (1): τ dist and τ prof .
In Table 2 , we report marginal tax rates on U.S. corporate profits and dividends for the years 1925-29. These are estimates of the tax paid on an additional dollar of these income types. Calculating the tax rate on profits is straightforward: we take the ratio of the NIPA profits tax liability to the before-tax profits (from Table A1 in the appendix).
The tax rate on dividends is more complicated: it's a weighted-average surtax rate on net income computed from data compiled and published by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service . In 1929, individual incomes were subject to either the normal tax or a surtax or both. As the names suggest, the normal tax was meant to be the primary source of revenues during nonemergencies. The surtax was used to meet revenue shortfalls typically occurring during wars or crises. The normal tax was not assessed on dividend income, but the surtax was. To compute a single tax rate on dividend income, then, we take a weighted average of surtax rates assessed on each net income class, where the weights are fractions of dividend income for each class. (See the appendix for details.)
Both tax rates shown in Table 2 are nearly constant over the 1925-29 period, a period of stable tax policy, and low when compared to rates during and after World War II. The tax rate on corporate profits was on average 14.6 percent, and the tax rate on dividends was on average 10.3 percent.
Capital Resource Costs.
By "resource cost," we mean the tax-unadjusted cost of attaining the asset. In the case of tangible capital, it is reproduction costs. We need estimates of the costs of capital assets, both tangible and intangible. We show that accounting for only tangible capital leads to the conclusion that the stock market in 1929 was close to 30 percent overvalued. Taking account of intangible capital as well-which Fisher (1930) argued was economically important-leads to the opposite conclusion: the stock market was not overvalued. In this way we see that inclusion of intangible capital is crucial in the analysis. 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 The Ratio of U.S. Corporate Tangible Capital and Land to GNP, 1925 GNP, -2000 In Figure 3 , we plot the total resource cost of end-of-period tangible capital plus the value of land, both relative to GNP, for the period 1925-2000. In 1929, the resource cost of total measured, tangible capital, which includes the value of inventories and land, was 1.4 times GNP. 10 This ratio changed little until the Great Depression period, when output fell more than 30 percent. By postwar standards, 1.4 times GNP is high. But tax rates on capital were much higher in the postwar period.
Using the average tax rates in Patents noted that more patents had been granted during the previous ten years than over the 100 year span 1789-1889 [Fisher, 1930, p. 127] . Implicitly, Fisher's view is that these inventions and patents had led to a large stock of intangible capital and would continue to for some time. by the NBER, which concluded that "the greater complexity of business problems and of the organization necessary to cope with them, have forced attention upon better methods of coordinating the plans and the work of specialists and executives" [Fisher, 1930, p. 143] . In other words, these investments enhanced the stock of corporate intangible capital.
Although Fisher had many good examples of intangible capital, he did not have sufficient data to actually measure it. We do. As we show in McGrattan and Prescott (2000), we
can estimate the value of intangible capital using data from the U.S. national income and product accounts, available since 1929. In particular, we can infer K I from the following relation between after-tax NIPA profits and corporate capital stocks:
where Π is after-tax NIPA profits, i is the real interest rate, and g is the trend growth rate of real output.
12 Two assumptions are needed to derive equation (2). First, we assume that the after-tax rate of return for tangible corporate capital is equal to the rate of return for intangible corporate capital and all other types of capital. (This is i in (2).) Otherwise, firms would not be operating in the interest of their owners. Second, we assume that tax policy is unchanging, so that steady-state analysis is appropriate.
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To see why (2) profits. This is the income subject to corporate profits tax. Thus, the BEA measure of after-tax corporate profits is
where δ T is the depreciation rate of tangible capital, τ prop is the property tax rate, and
intangible investment. In McGrattan and Prescott (2003a), we
show that the real after-tax return to tangible investment is (1−τ prof )(r T −δ T −τ prop ), while the real return to intangible investment is r I − δ I . The return on intangible investment is not affected by the corporate income tax rate because intangible investment can be expensed while tangible investment must be capitalized. Equation (2) follows immediately from the fact that both of these returns are equal to i, the real interest rate.
Using (2), we can infer the resource cost of intangible capital using observations on after-tax corporate profits (Figure 1) , the resource cost of tangible capital (Figure 3) , and the tax rate on corporate profits (Table 2) . We also need estimates of the real interest rate (i) and the trend growth rate of the economy (g).
We start with an estimate of the real interest rate i. Because of unmeasured intangible investment, we cannot directly infer i from corporate profits and corporate capital. But we can infer i from data for the noncorporate sector, which invests only a negligible amount in scientific research, organizational capital, and other intangibles; most of noncorporate capital is housing, farmland, and consumer durables. To construct i, we take the ratio of after-tax noncorporate profits-rental income, proprietors' capital income, net interest, and services of government and consumer capital-to the stock of capital generating these profits.
14 In 1929, this ratio is 4.73 percent. For the period 1929-2000, the ratio averages 4 percent.
As theory predicts, our estimate for i is similar in magnitude to the average return on long-term debt. 15 For example, nominal yields for Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds averaged 4.7 percent for the period 1925-29. We view this as a good approximation to the real yield since the United States was on a gold standard during this period, and given no trend in the relative price of gold, expectations of inflation should have been near zero.
Corporate bonds are fully taxable, so the relevant after-tax rates are somewhat lower. If we use yields on municipal tax-exempt high-grade bonds, which averaged 4.1 percent over 1925-29, our estimates of both the value of intangible capital and the fundamental value of the stock market would be higher. Thus, we view the 4.73 percent return on noncorporate capital as a conservative (that is, high) estimate for the real interest rate. Now to the trend growth rate of the economy (g), which is the sum of the growth in population and the growth in technology. Annual population growth had fallen to 1 percent by the late 1920s, and annual technological growth averaged 1.6 percent in the pre-Depression period, according to estimates of Kendrick (1961) . Summing these, our estimate for g is 2.6 percent, which is also a conservative estimate. This value is lower than an arithmetic average of growth rates of real GNP in the late 1920s. A larger value for g leads to higher estimates for the value of intangible assets and the fundamental value of the stock market.
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We can now compute our estimate for the resource cost of intangible capital:
The values used in (4) Prescott (2003a) .) The fact that it is sizeable is also consistent with Fisher's evidence.
We deduce from (1) and (4) that very low estimates of intangible capital and very high returns to tangible capital are required for the conclusion that the stock market in 1929 was overvalued. The reason is simple. By (1) and the fact that the value of tangible capital was high, a low prediction for the fundamental value of corporate equities requires a low value for intangible capital. With the value of intangible capital low, the return on tangible capital would have had to be extremely high in order to generate corporate profit shares as high as those observed in the 1920s. In the extreme case, with the value of intangibles equal to zero, the real after-tax return on tangible capital has to be 5.9 percent (that is, Π/K T in equation (4)), which is much higher than estimates based on national account data.
If we use our estimate in (4), we find that a conservative estimate for the fundamental value of U.S. corporations in 1929 was 1.9 times 1929 GNP, or 21.6 times 1929 after-tax corporate earnings. A fundamental value any lower is not justified by observations on profits, capital stocks, tax rates, growth rates, and interest rates.
With the highest reasonable estimate of the market value of U.S. corporations at the time being 1.67 times GNP, or 19 times corporate earnings, we conclude, as Fisher did, that corporate stocks were not overvalued at the time of the crash. If anything, they were undervalued.
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In February 1930, Irving Fisher's book The Stock Market Crash-and After was published. In this book, Fisher explains why he believed that stock prices were low in the fall of 1929, placing much emphasis on the value of intangible assets. Galbraith (1955) , like many economic historians before and after him, viewed the crash as clear evidence that Fisher was wrong. Fisher's book attracted little attention, according to Galbraith (1955) , because "one trouble with being wrong is that it robs the prophet of his audience when he most needs it to explain why" (p. 146).
Here, we have examined this period with the aid of tools Fisher did not have: historical data and modern theory. We have, in effect, asked, what level of stock prices is justified by the value of tangible and intangible assets owned by corporations, which we have called the fundamental value. At the start, we set out to quantify by how much the market was overvalued relative to this fundamental value. Theory and data forced us to conclude that it was actually undervalued. Our conservative estimate of the fundamental value of U.S. corporations in 1929 is no less than 21 times corporate earnings (or 1.9 times GNP), whereas a conservative estimate for the market value of U.S. corporate equities in 1929 is no greater than 19 times corporate earnings (or 1.67 times GNP). In other words, with regard to the value of the 1929 stock market, Irving Fisher was right.
But, the primary goal of this study is not to assess the acumen of Fisher. Rather, our goal is to further the development of a theoretical benchmark useful for determining whether the stock market is overvalued or undervalued at a point in time. The value of such a theory is a better basis for investors and policymakers to make informed decisions.
In this appendix, we describe sources for the data used in the figures and tables of the main text, and we display some detailed data behind some calculations in the text.
Figure 1
• After-tax corporate profits: See notes for Table A1 for 1925-28; and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis , NIPA Table 1 .14, for 1929 and after.
• GNP: Romer (1989), • Market value of all listed NYSE companies: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis .
• GNP: See notes to Figure 1 .
Figure 3
• Tangible corporate capital: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis , fixed asset , NIPA Table 5 .12, for 1946 and after.
• Land: Goldsmith (1956), Table W -30, before 1946; and U.S. Internal Revenue Service (1916-99) , corporate balance sheets, for 1946 and after.
• GNP: See notes to Figure 1 . Table 1 • Market value and earnings of 135 industrials: Sloan (1936, p. 5).
• S&P company list, market values, earnings: See notes for Table A2 .
• Price-earnings ratio of 45 industrials: Fisher (1930, p. 86), Chart 11.
• Number of NYSE companies: New York Stock Exchange (1960), historical section.
• Market value of all listed NYSE companies: See notes to Figure 2.
• GNP: See notes to Figure 1 . Table 2 • Tax rate on profits: Rows in Table A1 -"Profits tax liability, NIPA" to "Profits before taxes, NIPA."
• Tax rate on dividends: U.S. Internal Revenue Service (1916-99), basic tables for individual returns (Tables 2 and 7 for years 1925-29) and instructions for 1040, which have the surtax rates. Tax rates are constructed as follows: take the ratio of "Net income" to "Number of returns" for each net income class from Table 2 ; find the marginal surtax rate for that net income class in the 1040 instructions; multiply the marginal surtax rate for each net income class by the fraction of dividend income earned by that class found in Table 7 ; and add across classes to get a weighted average.
Table A1
• NIPA profits after-tax, 1925-28: All original data sources listed in U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1985), Table 3 . Some data are missing because they are not in the public domain. Any missing figures appear in bold and are estimated to be proportional to "Total receipts less total deductions," with the factor of proportionality equal to the 1929 ratio.
Table A2
• Company list: Standard and Poor's (1990, p. 115).
• Market values: CRSP monthly stock database.
• Earnings: Moody's Investor Services (1930) and Poor's Publishing Company (1930) .
Other Data Cited in Text
• Population: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990), Table 16 .
• GNP deflator: Romer (1989), Table 2 .
• Return on noncorporate capital: McGrattan and Prescott (2003c) .
• Bond yields: Federal Reserve Board (1943), Table 128 . Figure 1 with Donaldson and Kamstra's (1996) Figure 7 . The reason is that accurately estimating the present value of dividends in this way is difficult, if not impossible.
3 Hall (2001) has an alternative way to estimate the value of corporate intangible capital, namely, the value of corporate equity and debt less the value of corporate tangible assets. His method cannot be used for determining whether the stock market is overvalued or undervalued as it assumes that the market is correctly valued. This is equal to the ratio of the end-of-year market capitalization to 1929 earnings reported by Standard and Poor's (1990) .
8 Thus, any measure that we get of the value of corporate equity in 1929 overstates the total value of corporations, equity plus debt.
9 For details on the derivation of equation (1), see McGrattan and Prescott (2003a) . In
McGrattan and Prescott (2003a), we also include the possibility of capital subsidies which are not relevant for 1929. 10 We have left out capital of foreign subsidiaries, which is also not included in BEA measures. But this capital is insignificant in 1929.
11 Both studies take a very different approach from ours here.
12 For details on the derivation of equation (2), see McGrattan and Prescott (2000, 2003a) .
13 Support for this assumption is Table 2 and the time series of macro aggregates in Kendrick (1961) . University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, 1926 Business, -2000 . 
